My two-year old granddaughter sees the world differently from most adults. First, the commonplace is extraordinary to her. Every tree, bush and rock, every ant, dog and butterfly are objects of fascination; every ball, stick, and swing immerse her in play. Being in her presence I find, to my surprise, that I too pause to find the ordinary … extraordinary.

But there is a darker side to being with her. I sometimes tell her about my mother or my father, and soon she will ask “where are they?” I could give a comforting answer, but I must tell her the truth—they are gone and will never come back. And when she asks, “what of you and grandma? Then I will have to tell her that we too will someday go and never come back. And the same with her mom and dad. And the same with her.

In response it is easy to see why people have told lies to their children for millenia—to protect them from a sinister reality. But we shouldn’t lie to them. We should tell them the horrible truth, and we should all face this horrible truth, in the hope that it motivates us to change it. Joy and peace should reign; death and suffering should be optional.

Children help us to see both what the world is, and what it could be. And for that, thanks young little one. And here’s a song for you.

Review of Sam Harris’ Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion

I recently finished Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion, and found it a welcome addition to the literature on mindfulness. It also adds to the growing literature that tries to find alternatives to the antiquated religions which are slowly losing their appeal for millions of people. (Just this week a new Pew study chronicled the decline of religion in the USA.)

Anyone familiar with some of Harris’ other works (The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, and Letter to a Christian Nation) knows that he is an atheist, but readers of this book will find out, surprisingly perhaps, that Harris spent many years learning meditation techniques from Buddhists masters. This insights derived from his meditative experiences leads to his prescription for attaining spirituality without religion—Buddhist based mindfulness meditation. Such meditation leads to realization that what we call the self or the ego is essentially an illusion. (I have written previously about some of these topics herehere and here.)

Harris claims that while anyone can experience the insights derived from meditation, “Only Buddhists and students of Advaita Vedanta … have been absolutely clear in asserting that the spiritual life consists in overcoming the illusion of self by paying close attention to our experience in the present moment.” Eastern religions are clearly superior to their western counterparts for attaining spiritual insight. By contrast, “As manuals of contemplative understanding, The Bible and Koran are worse than useless.” Of course Harris notes that not all “Buddhists and Hindus have been sophisticated contemplatives” for those traditions “have spawned many of the same pathologies as we see elsewhere among the faithful: dogmatism, anti-intellectualism, tribalism, otherworldliness. ”

But the differences between western and eastern religion can’t be overstated. Interest in controlling the mind and understanding the nature, cause, and possible ways to end suffering are enough for those who want to travel the eastern paths. Buddhism and Advaita Hinduism are mere lab manuals that help one explore human consciousness. And, as Harris puts it, “My purpose in writing this book is to encourage you to investigate certain contemplative insights for yourself, without accepting the metaphysical ideas that they inspired in ignorant and isolated peoples of the past.” This is a journey of self-understanding is one that we should all make.

(I have tried to judge this book on its own merits. I know that Harris is a controversial figure, and I disagree with many of his political and philosophical views.)

“On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”

What follows is an outline of  Mary Anne Warren’s 1973 piece, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” It is considered a classic of the literature and still reprinted in college textbooks.

Will show that the fetus is not a person, and hence not  worthy of full moral rights. Most anti-abortion arguments don’t do this but instead defend abortion by 1) pointing out the negative consequences of restricting access; or 2) claim the woman controls her body.

Both arguments are problematic.

The key question is whether the fetus is a person.

Thomson had a key insight – even if a fetus has rights, that doesn’t mean they supersede a woman’s.

Section 1 – She argues that we can’t conclusively demonstrate that abortion is permissible if the fetus has a right to life. T’s argument fails in that the AA may argue that one is responsible for the child except in rape cases. If we change the violinist story, it appears we may still be obligated to save the violinist. Thus we must deal with the ontological status of the fetus.

Section 2 – The question is: “How are we to define the moral community, the set of beings with full and equal moral rights, such that we can decide whether a human fetus is a member of this community or not?”  Two questions arise: 1) what is a human (genetic sense of human) and 2) what is a person (moral sense of human)?

To be a person you must satisfy at least 2 or 3 of her criteria—but fetuses satisfy none of these. A fetus is not a person by any objective measure and thus not a member of the moral community.

This raises 2 other questions: 1) how like a human does something have to be to have a right to life and 2) do potential people have a right to life? Regarding 1, a fetus is not very personlike, in fact less so than a mature fish (according to her criteria). Regarding 2, the rights of potential people, even millions of them, cannot outweigh the rights of actual people.  Even if they could kill you and make millions of people out of you you still have the right to escape (self-defense). Or even if you only had to be captured for nine months or a day (pregnancy) or even if you had been captured because of carelessness (you were partly responsible, never completely responsible as the man has some responsibility) you still have a right to escape no matter how many potential people might be born because the rights of an actual person always outweigh the rights of potential persons.

The argument does not apply to infanticide primarily because while in her body the woman has the primary say as to what happens to the fetus whereas after something is born, she no longer does.

“A Defense of Abortion”

A Defense of Abortion” – JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON

Thomson’s (T) imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made A Defense of Abortion perhaps “the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy“.

T does not think the conceptus is a person from the moment of conception, anymore than an acorn is an oak tree.  But, for the sake of argument, she will grant this claim and ask if the impermissibility of abortion follows.

Assuming the personhood of the fetus, the anti-abortionist argument proceeds thus:

Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happens in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person’s right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother’s right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.

T responds with a thought experiment:

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own … [If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but] in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.

While it would be kind of you to let the violinist stay attached to your body, almost no one would think you are morally obligated to do so. This suggests that abortion is morally permissible in cases of rape.  Of course strong opponents of abortion may still say that one has a right to life even if one is conceived as a result of rape or the mother’s life is in danger.  (T calls the latter “the extreme view.”)

Section 1 – How are we to defend the anti-abortion position in cases where the mother will die if she brings the child to full term? We could say that abortion kills the innocent child, whereas the mother will merely be allowed to die. But T argues that cases of self-defense are clearly not murder.

The abortion debate often focuses on what a 3rd party (a dr. for example) may do when a woman asks for an abortion (since it is very difficult to do this herself.) Now a 3rd party may say they don’t want to kill a growing child trapped with you in a tiny house. But surely you have the right of self-defense in that situation. This shows the extreme view of abortion is false.

Section 2 – The anti-abortionist (AA) could change their argument and say abortion is ok in cases of self-defense but 3rd parties can’t perform them, only pregnant women can.  But this is false. If you own the house that the growing child is expanding in you have more right to it than he/she does.  Thus, 3rd parties should recognize this just as they would recognize the one who owns the coat has a right to it. One can say that they don’t want to get the coat back or perform the abortion, but they shouldn’t say that someone else shouldn’t do this—kill a person who is threatening another’s life.  Since abortion in cases of self-defense has been defended, T turns to other possibilities.

Section 3 – Does having the right to life mean I have a right to the bare minimum that it takes to keep me alive? Suppose that the only thing that will keep me alive is if Angela Jolie flies from CA and kisses me or gives me one of her kidneys.  Does this mean she has to share her kidney with me? No. Nobody has a right to her kidneys unless she give them that right. It might be nice of her to do this, but I don’t have the right to demand she do it. Now suppose that the right to life means I have the right not to be killed. Even so, my right to life doesn’t give me the right to use your body (unless you give me permission.) So even if my life is not threatened by your using my kidneys for 9 months, I don’t have to give you permission to do so, [even if I know that my refusal will result in your death.]

Section 4 – “In the most ordinary sort of case, to deprive someone of what he has a right to is to treat him unjustly … [but] The right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly.”  You do not kill something unjustly if you kill it so you don’t have to share your kidneys with it. So the argument against abortion must show it is unjust killing. In the case of rape, no permission is granted and thus the killing of the fetus is justified.

But what about the cases of voluntary sexual activity? In those cases, did the woman invite the fetus in and does the fetus now have a right to the woman’s body? And how do we determine the extent of this responsibility? If a woman opens her window or leaves her house knowing there are rapists in the world (or just charming men) is she then responsible if she gets pregnant? Or suppose she installs bars on her windows (contraception) and burglars (or charming men) get in anyway even though she took precautions. Is she responsible and does the fetus now have a right to her body?

Or suppose:

Peopleseeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don’t want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the personplant who now develops have a right to the use of your house?

We can hardly expect you never go outside or have a hysterectomy or only travel with an army.  We would have to figure out all these cases but in some cases abortion would be unjust killing and some not. [We could have a continuum from you never leave home to you sell yourself on the street to get pregnant so you can have an abortion. The point is that every case is different. So as your responsibility for becoming pregnant increases, so to do your obligation to carry to full term. But your responsibility is not the only factor to consider. We must also consider how much you are inconvenienced.]

Section 5 – You were kidnapped by the violinist (raped) but he only needed one hour at no risk to your health.  In such cases you ought not abort. But this does not mean the violinist has a right to use your kidney.  [Of course if you became pregnant in the usual way, this would be even more clear.] It may be nice to share my chocolates, but you don’t have a right to them if they’re mine. Even if Angela Jolie is right across the room and only needs to kiss me to save my life, I have no right to her kiss, even though it would not be nice of her to refuse. So even if only an hour of the mother’s body is needed to save a life—the mother is not morally required to do so. [Does it follow that if I invited the fetus in and then want to kick them out and it won’t go, that I have a right to kill it?]

Section 6 – “We have in fact to distinguish between the two kinds of Samaritan: the Good Samaritan and what we might call the Minimally Decent Samaritan.” The law does not require we be even MDC but “in most states in this country women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside them.” To be consistent, anti-abortionists should work for GS laws.

And if you ask us to keep you from being a GS or a very GS, (not remain pregnant) we should probably help you if you don’t want to be in bed with the violinist for 9 months or years.

Section 7 – Even if the fetus is a person the impermissibility of abortion does not follow.  But maybe it is that the fetus “is a person for whom the woman has a special kind of responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its mother” that makes abortion immoral. Here we must distinguish between cases in which parents did not try to avoid pregnancy, take children home with them, etc. and thus are responsible from cases in which they tried not to conceive, etc. In some cases abortion would be justified. [Again, each case is different.]

Section 8 – However if pregnancy only requires being a MDS, then one should not abort. In other cases one should abort. [Who should decide this, mother, parents, churches, states, etc.?]But the mother has no right to insist on the death of the fetus, if it somehow can survive.

T concludes by noting she has assumed the fetus is a person, but early abortions clearly do not kill persons. [Her acorn, oak tree argument.]

“Why Abortion Is Immoral”

Why Abortion Is Immoral” is the most celebrated pro-life piece in the literature. Marquis (M) begins by noting that few philosophers think abortion is immoral, in fact, the pro-life position has almost no contemporary philosophical support:

The view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, seriously immoral has received little support in the recent philosophical literature. No doubt most philosophers affiliated with secular institutions of higher education believe that the anti-abortion position is either a symptom of irrational religious dogma or a conclusion generated by seriously confused philosophical argument. The purpose of this essay is to undermine this general belief.

He assumes, but doesn’t try to prove, “that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end.”

M asks: “why is killing an adult wrong.”

Killing is wrong because of its effect on the victim—specifically because it takes away a person’s future.

This explains why: 1) killing is so bad; and 2) why premature death is particularly bad.

This view gains additional support because: 1) it shows why it would be wrong to kill other intelligent extraterrestrials; 2) it shows why it would be wrong to kill some non-human animals; 3) it does not rule out active euthanasia; and 4) it easily accounts for the wrongfulness of young children (something personhood theories have trouble with).

Since eliminating an adult’s future is what makes killing it wrong, abortion is wrong prima facie (at first glance.) And this does not rely on the fetus being a person. [According to this view, it would seem that killing a fetus is more wrong than killing a child, which is more wrong than killing an adult, etc.]

To better explain the structure of his argument he draws an analogy with an argument against animal cruelty. In both cases the wrongness is explained by the appeal to a natural property—pain and suffering or denial of a future—without resorting to personhood.

None of this shows that abortion is always wrong, just that it usually is.

And contraception is not immoral on this view. Neither sperm nor ovum can possibly be considered a person and contraception can’t be considered to deny all possible sperm and egg combinations which are possible since there are so many possible futures at the time contraception is used. (This might imply that contraception is worse, since it denies millions of possible futures. Also, at what point are we denying this future then? After the 24-48 hours of conception I would assume.)

Conclusion – Since a fetus has a future, which is what makes killing wrong, killing a fetus is wrong. This resolves the standard problem of abortion which is to determine some property that makes a fetus more like a person than a group of cells—brain waves, viability, etc. That property is its possible future.

Reflections – First of all, remember—even if you think abortion is morally wrong that does not imply that you have a right to use the coercive power of the law to prevent others ending their pregnancies. To endorse that would entail a justification of the use of legal coercion on the ground that you are preventing harm to others (fetuses). The problem is that not all share the view that fetuses are persons. (In fact granting fetuses full moral rights is a radical view that virtually no moral philosophers endorse—as Marquis admitted at the beginning of his essay.) If people disagree about whether something is a person, then what do you do if you can’t convince them of your view? Kill them? Petition the government to coerce them? Try to convince them rationally but if unsuccessful let them alone?

It is just hard to believe that this weak argument is consider the best anti-abortion argument in the literature. For a more complete account of my view on abortion, and the standard one according to most moral philosophers, see my posts here and here.